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Abstract
This paper incorporates learning and reputation building into a simple dynamic stochastic model
of international trade with asymmetric information. We use the model to study a bilateral trade
ow inuenced signicantly by learning and reputation, namely U.S. imports of Japanese cars over
the period 1961-2005. Numerical simulations replicate the trade ow in a robust fashion. In addition
to matching this event, we explore further implications of our framework for understanding interna-
tional trade patterns. Since learning and reputation building require time, predicted short run trade
patterns can be quite dierent than those predicted in the long run. Sectorial dierences in the
speed of learning and reputation building aect predicted trade patterns. The extent of asymmetric
information existing between importers and exporters also changes under dierent trade policies.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how asymmetric information aects international trade patterns and how learning
and building up a reputation may be crucial in reducing information problems in international trade.
In the framework we develop, asymmetric information exists regarding producers' (exporters') char-
acteristics.1 Consumers (importers) cannot completely observe the characteristics of exporters and
have imperfect information about them, whereas exporters fully know their own characteristics. These
informational asymmetries create frictions in the business dealings between importers and exporters
which inhibit the ow of goods internationally. Since learning (for importers) and reputation building
(for exporters) requires time, we nd predicted short run trade patterns can be quite dierent than
those predicted in the long run. Our framework provides new tools for analyzing data on international
trade ows. We apply these tools to the case of Japanese car exports to the U.S., nding that numerical
simulations of our model are capable of replicating the trade ow in a robust fashion.
Since the publication of Akerlof (1970), it has been well understood how asymmetric information
can cause adverse selection in markets. We argue asymmetric information problems are crucial in in-
ternational markets, even more so than closed economies, since information regarding foreign exporters
is potentially less available and more dicult to access. For instance, inspection of foreign exporters
may be dicult and costly to undertake. As a result, asymmetric information problems about a foreign
exporter's productivity or the quality of a foreign exporter's good can be more severe in international
markets. Additional factors, such as culture, language, or religion, have further eects on international
markets with informational asymmetries. These factors can either exacerbate the problem by building
prejudices between groups who dier in these respects or alleviate it by networking geographically
dispersed groups together who are similar in these respects.2
In environments with informational asymmetries, Spence (1973) demonstrates how signaling can
improve the market outcome, and Shapiro (1983) shows how building up a reputation can be important
as well. Similarly, in international markets, exporters can use signals to build their reputations and
alleviate problems caused by asymmetric information. Falvey (1989) extends the framework used in
Shapiro (1983) to study the eects of commercial trade policies, such as origin labelling requirements,
1In general, the characteristics we discuss here can be thought of as aecting the consumers' beliefs, such as producers'
productivity, quality, reliability, etc. For simplicity, we later narrow our concept of characteristics to be just productivity
in our model.
2See, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) for a study involving a set of European Union countries on how
culture eects trust between citizens of dierent countries and how these bilateral trust relations aect international trade,
portfolio investment, and foreign direct investment. See Gould (1994), Greif (1989), and Rauch and Trindade (2002) for
examples of ethnic-based networks as means to alleviate asymmetric information problems and facilitate international
trade.
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in a world in which reputation matters.
In parallel to the above ndings, we argue that all these concepts|asymmetric information, learn-
ing, signaling, and reputation building|are important in international trade and should be incor-
porated into models in the international trade literature. The international trade literature usually
implicitly assumes perfect information among agents, and, hence, asymmetric information plays no
role.3 Since the main goal of this paper is to emphasize the idea that reputation building and learning
are important in determining trade patterns, we focus our attention on developing a simple mechanism
which clearly shows the relation between these forces. Our model is not based on traditional trade
theory models and excludes some features of standard models. In particular, we take trade incentives
as given and then narrow our attention to how asymmetric information, reputation, and learning aect
international trade. Future research can incorporate these ideas into existing trade models. We then
apply our mechanism to the study of Japanese car exports to the U.S.. The results of our analysis sug-
gest researchers should consider information dynamics when trying to understand international trade
data.
The mechanism we propose works as follows: There are two types of agents, exporters and importers.
Exporters have private information about their characteristics. Importers only have beliefs about these
characteristics. Importers wish to exchange their endowments for the output produced by exporters.
The importers make oers to exporters in exchange for shipments of exporters' goods. These oers are
based on beliefs importers hold about exporters' characteristics. Importers' beliefs, in turn, depend
on the export history of an exporter, that is, an exporter's reputation. Exporters choose to accept or
reject the oer depending on its protability and how acceptance may aect the exporters' reputations.
Hence, exporters potentially have the chance to send signals to aect the beliefs of importers through
their acceptance of an oer and their output performance. An exporter can either build up a good or
bad history or reputation through their output performance. Importers learn about the characteristics
of exporters after receiving and consuming the shipment of goods and update their beliefs accordingly.
All importers share common information. Updated beliefs aect future decisions, because importers
change their oers according to their updated beliefs. After learning about the exporters, if an importer
undervalued (overvalued) their characteristics and shipments of goods previously, then the importer
can raise (lower) the oers. The setup of our model draws heavily from features in Holmstrom (1999).
We use our model to study the experience of U.S. car imports from Japan over the years 1961-2005.
3See, however, Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) for a recent treatment of asymmetric information and learning in
the international nance literature.
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The evolution of this trading experience depends in part on asymmetric information, learning, and
reputation. Very few Japanese cars were exported to the U.S. before the 1970's. Before that time, big
American cars ruled the road. American consumers showed little interest in the lightweight compact
cars slowly trickling into the American market from Asia. The oil crises of the 1970's changed all that,
though, as Americans began to show an interest in the fuel ecient Japanese cars.
As American consumers learned more about the new Japanese cars, they discovered that not only
were the Asian imports fuel ecient, but they were well-built and reliable vis-a-vis their American
rivals. Japanese cars established a good reputation, as evidenced by such publications as Consumer
Reports. Japanese car imports to the U.S. increased dramatically thereafter. In addition, Wojcik (2001)
documents total sales of Japanese cars in the U.S. as increasing by 427% over the years 1971-1990,
while total new car sales increased by only 9%. Total sales numbers for Japanese cars from 1971 to 1990
are primarily being driven by imports, since Japanese manufactures did not begin setting up factories
in the U.S. until the mid-1980's.
In order to apply our model to the experience of U.S. imports of Japanese cars, we simulate our
model numerically to generate sample model time series data. The model's parameters are chosen using
two alternative procedures, one feeding the observed oil shocks into the model and one a maximum
likelihood method. We compare the simulated model data with the actual time series data and nd
that the model does a good job of matching the actual data. We show the reliability of these results
with a test of robustness. Our test consists of simulating the model 10000 times and calculating the
average model time series. We then construct a condence interval around this average by adding
and subtracting two standard deviations measured from the 10000 simulations of model data. These
bands convey the robustness of our results. After showing the capability of our model in capturing
the Japanese car experience, we discuss further results from our model which highlight the eects of
asymmetric information, learning, and reputation in international trade.
Even though the structure of our model diers from Melitz (2003), it predicts similar results, namely
that rms engaged in exporting are relatively more productive. However, this is a long run result, which
corresponds to the case when asymmetric information problems have been reduced. In our model, the
reduction of asymmetric information problems occurs when importers' beliefs are similar to the actual
characteristics of the rms. In this case, our model makes the same predictions as Melitz (2003). In
the short run, however, when asymmetric information still exists between importers and exporters, the
results of our model are dierent. A rm's ability to export depends not only on its characteristics but
also on what importers believe about those characteristics. Hence, an important implication of models
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with asymmetric information is that short run trade patterns can be quite dierent from those seen in
the long run. Consequently, this can aect things like government policies as well.
One could argue that the learning and reputation building process generating the transition from
the short (high informational asymmetries) to long run (low informational asymmetries) trade patterns
occurs quite quickly. This might be true for some sectors, such as foods and beverages, in which it is
easier to obtain information and update beliefs. For other sectors, however, the speed of the learning
and reputation building process is much slower. Shapiro (1983) cites the automobile industry as such
a sector. Information regarding a particular car or car manufacture is revealed slowly over the course
of the entire life of that car. Characteristics such as reliability can only be observed after long periods
of time. Our model captures this sectorial dierence in the speed of learning and reputation building
with a parameter. We then show how our model's predicted trade patterns change with changes in this
parameter.
We measure the extent of asymmetric information existing between importers and exporters in our
model by identifying the relation between importers' beliefs and exporters' true characteristics. Track-
ing this relation over time allows us to show how the informational environment in which importers and
exporters interact changes. The relation between importers' beliefs and exporters' true characteristics
can be thought of as a policy variable, which can be aected through dierent channels. We show
that the incorporation of trade barriers or export subsidies in our model eects this relation, alongside
the eects on trade patterns. In the case of trade barriers, exporters nd it more dicult to export,
which draws out the learning and reputation building process. As a result, the length of time required
to reduce asymmetric information increases compared to the free trade case with no export subsidy
policy. Export subsides produce the opposite result. The learning and reputation process shortens,
as exporters now nd it easier to export with the aid of subsidies. It then follows that asymmetric
information between importers and exporters decreases faster than the free trade case with no export
subsidy policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model in detail. In
section 3, we use our model to evaluate the experience of U.S. car imports from Japan. In section 4,
we discuss additional model results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic stochastic model of international trade with asymmetric infor-
mation. This model is not built upon a standard international trade model and excludes some features
of these models, as mentioned in the introduction. Instead, our model focuses exclusively on how
asymmetric information, reputation, and learning can be crucial in the international trade literature.
As discussed in the introduction, exporters build their reputations based on characteristics observed
by importers. For example, we could model reputation based on expected quality or, as we prefer to
do here, expected productivity. In the case of expected quality, we could x the output produced by
each exporter i, normalizing it to 1 for simplicity, and allow for dierent quality levels. Since importers
do not know ex-ante which exporter produces higher quality goods, importers learn by making oers
to all exporters. There is noise in the learning process, so importers only identify the exact quality
level of each exporter in the limit. Hence, in the short run, importers make oers to every exporter
in every period. Our model focuses on this transition, not the limit case. Given the representative
importer does not have exact information about quality levels, importers make oers to each exporter i
according to their expectations for quality conditional on their information set. In this case, exporters
choose the quality level to export in order to aect the importers' beliefs.
What we do in this model is an isomorphic version of the above. Instead of xing the output level,
we focus on a homogeneous good, normalizing the price to 1. We then allow dierent levels of output
for each exporter i. The importers' oers are determined by expected quantity. Exporters now choose
their output level to aect the importers' beliefs instead of quality. Hence, our model captures the
idea of reputation as being the ability to produce more of the same good per period. We do this for
simplicity. In general, our idea of reputation captures not only productivity, but also characteristics
like quality, reliability, etc.
2.1 Environment
Consider an economy with two countries, home and foreign.4 We are mainly interested in studying
imports to the home country, so we divide our economy's agents into home country importers and
foreign country exporters. We assume importers are on the long side of the market. For simplicity, the
home country contains a continuum of identical risk-neutral importers, and the foreign country contains
a nite number of risk-neutral exporters which operate independently of one another. Competition
4This two country model can easily be extended to the multi-country case.
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ensures that importers pay their full surplus when importing from an exporter. This market structure
is commonly employed in simple reputation models. See, for example, Tadelis (1999).
Foreign country exporters produce and potentially export a homogeneous good, y, to the home
country. In contrast, importers do not possess the technology to produce y. In each period, importers
are endowed with !. Importers want to exchange their endowment, !, for good y. Since we are focusing
on studying imports to the home country, domestic production is not modeled.5 In the case of the
home country, this can be interpreted as there also being domestic production for goods similar to y,
but not exactly the good y. Due to taste for variety, the home country also wants to consume good
y. In the case of the foreign country, this can be interpreted as all the exporters producing for their
domestic market with some getting the chance to export and some not. Lastly, the economy exists for
an innite number of discrete time periods indexed by t = 0; 1; :::.
2.2 Information Structure and Uncertainty
The key feature of this model is asymmetric information between importers and exporters. Exporters,
indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; I, have potentially dierent actual productivity levels, i. Productivity levels
are assumed to be xed over time, that is, at the beginning of time t = 0, each exporter is assigned
a productivity level, which they keep forever. These actual productivity levels are exporters' private
information and are incompletely known by importers. Rather, importers hold prior beliefs, ^i0, about
each exporter's actual productivity level, i. Importers' prior beliefs, ^i0, are assumed to be normally
distributed with mean ^i0 and variance 
2
^i0
. As time passes, learning about i will occur through the
observation of exporter i's output. This gives rise to endogenously determined posterior beliefs, which
will aect the status of the exporters.
Importers cannot directly observe the productivity level of individual exporters due to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, it. We assume that it is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
2
 .
We also assume productivity shocks are i.i.d. across exporters and time. These productivity shocks,
it, along with an exporter's productivity level, i, determine exporter i's output, yit, at time t, which
is given by the technology6
yit = maxfi + it; 0g; (1)
where each exporter i knows the actual realization of it at the beginning of each period t, but importers
5Adding domestic production to our model will not change the qualitative nature of the results.
6We do not allow the case when yit < 0. This restriction implies a negative productivity shock can at most reduce an
exporter's output to zero.
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only know the distribution of it. The exporters' production technology is assumed to be publicly
known. Under the above specication of the productivity shocks' distribution, we refer to it < 0
as \bad" shocks and it > 0 as \good" shocks, since they decrease or increase an exporter's output
respectively.
Importers cannot observe i and it separately but can only observe the total output, yit, if the
exporter ships goods to the home country. Importers update their beliefs according to the total output
they observe being shipped by each exporter. Information about each exporter perfectly spreads among
the importers. In the event that an exporter chooses not to ship any amount of the good, yit, in a
given period, then importers do not change their beliefs about this exporter.
Exporters also experience idiosyncratic cost shocks, uit. We assume that uit is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance 2u. The cost shocks are i.i.d. across exporters and time. Both exporters
and importers know the distribution of uit, but only exporters observe the actual realization of uit at
the beginning of the period. The exporters' cost function is assumed to be publicly known:
cit = maxff   uit; 0g; (2)
where f is a xed cost of exporting and is the same across exporters and time.
2.3 Timing
Figure 1 summarizes the timing within a period in the model. At time t = 0, exporters know their i's.
In addition to this information, at the beginning of each period, exporters see their productivity shocks,
it, and cost shocks, uit. After the realization of the productivity and cost shocks to each exporter,
importers make oers, it, to each exporter i at time t according to their beliefs in that period.
7 The
importers' oers, it, are made from their total endowment, !t. Given the oer and the realization of
the productivity and cost shocks, an exporter decides either to accept or reject the oer. If an exporter
chooses to accept the oer, then importers pay their oer, it, to the exporter, and the exporter pays
the cost of producing and exporting, cit, and ships the output, yit, to the home country. If an exporter
chooses to reject the oer, then the exporter receives zero payment, and no cost is paid. Once the
shipments of output arrive in the home country, importers update their beliefs based on the output
received. Importers update their beliefs about those exporters who actually shipped goods and keep
the same beliefs for those who did not ship goods.
7There is no renegotiation between importers and exporters in a given period. An interpretation of this assumption is
that negotiation between rms engaged in international trade is costly and time consuming. Thus, renegotiation within
a given period is prohibited.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
i? , it? , itu
known by
exporters
it?  made by 
importers 
exporters
accept or 
reject it?
if accept:  importers pay it?
     exporters pay cit
     and ship yit
if reject:  importers pay 0 
    exporters pay 0 
    and ship 0 
if accept:  importers update  
    beliefs 
if reject:  importers keep  
beliefs the same Figure 1:
Timing Within a Period
2.4 Importers
There is a continuum of risk-neutral importers of measure M in the home country with importers
indexed by m. Importers are endowed with !t in each period and wish to exchange their endowment
for the homogeneous good, y. In each period, representative importer m makes a list of oers with
one oer for each exporter. The representative importer m chooses how much to oer each exporter
according to the beliefs at that period, ^it. The expected utility of importer m at time t for dealing
with a particular exporter i is given by
Umit = Et[yit]  it; (3)
where Et[] denotes the expectations with respect to the importer's available information at the begin-
ning of time t and  is the oer paid to the exporter.8
Under risk neutrality, the competitive market equilibrium implies the market oer for each exporter
i will be
it (
it) = E[yitj
it] = ^it 8 i; t > 0; (4)
where 
it = fyt 1i ; g and yt 1i = fyi0; :::; yit 1g 8 i; t > 0.9

it denotes the information set available to importers about exporter i at time t. The information
8An importer's total utility is given by
PI
i=1 U
m
it . We also assume
PI
i it = !t 8 t, which implies importers have an
exactly sucient amount of endowment in each period.
9At t = 0, i0 = ^i0 . Note that, because E[it] = 0, the productivity shocks, it, do not inuence the optimal oers
made by importers. From now on, we simply denote the importer's information set about exporter i as the history of
output, yt 1i .
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set consists of the history of exporter i's output up to time t, yt 1i . Since importers update their beliefs
according to exporter i's output each period, their information sets are also updated. Importers only
update their information set for an exporter if that exporter decides to accept the oer and ship an
amount of goods to the home country. If an exporter decides not to accept the oer and not ship any
goods, then importers do not update their information set for that particular exporter. We choose
to simplify importers' learning in this manner since there are multiple reasons why an exporter might
reject the oer. This important point is discussed further in section 2.5. 
it is always the same for
all importers, as additional information received by representative importer m in each period perfectly
spreads among importers.
If an exporter accepts the oer and sends an amount of the good, yit, then learning on the part of
the importers results in normally distributed posterior beliefs, ^it+1. The mean, ^it+1 , and precision,
h^it+1 , of ^it+1 are given by
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^it+1 =
^ith^it + yith
h^it + h
and h^it+1 = h^it + h; (5)
where h's denote precisions of the respective variables. If an exporter rejects the oer and does not
send any goods, than importers will have the same beliefs next period:
^it+1 = ^it and h^it+1 = h^it : (6)
We choose to use precisions in equation (5) and (6) to simplify the discussion of results in section 4.
2.5 Exporters
We formulate the exporter's problem recursively for expositional simplicity.11 At the beginning of a
period, let v(; h; ; u) be the optimal value of the problem for an exporter with (; h; ; u).12  refers
to the mean of the importers' beliefs. By equation (4), it is clear that  = . We could either use 
or  as a state variable. h refers to the precision of the importers' beliefs.  and u are the realized
productivity and cost shocks at a given period. The set (; h; ; u) summarizes the state variables for
an exporter.
Lemma 1 If an exporter chooses to accept, then y =  + .
Proof : See Appendix A.
10This is a well-known learning formula resulting from the normality and independence assumptions. See, for instance,
Holmstrom (1999).
11We also formulate the problem sequentially in appendix A.
12Note that WLOG we drop the i's.
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Using Lemma 1, an exporter only decides whether to accept or reject the oer made by importers.
The Bellman equation is given by
v(; h; ; u) = max
n
 +
Z Z
v(0; h0; 0; u0)dF (u0)dG(0);
Z Z
v(; h; 0; u0)dF (u0)dG(0)
o
; (7)
subject to the constraints
  0; (8)
0 =
h+ h( + )
h+ h
; (9)
h0 = h+ h; (10)
where  =    f + u. The xed cost, f ; actual productivity, ; and precision of the distribution of
productivity shocks, h, are constant over time.
The maximization is over the two actions: (1) accept the oer or (2) reject the oer. The rst term
on the R.H.S. of equation (7) refers to the case of accepting. An exporter earns current prot, , and
begins the next period facing importers with updated beliefs, 0 and h0. The second term on the R.H.S.
of equation (7) refers to the case of rejecting. An exporter earns zero prot today and faces importers
with the same beliefs,  and h, during the next period. Successive draws of  and u are independent.
F (u), the c.d.f. of u, and G(), the c.d.f. of , are independent of each other. There is no returning
to earlier options. Equation (8) shows the nonnegativity condition for . Equations (9) and (10) show
how  and h evolve over time.
Proposition 1: Given Lemma 1 and (; h; ; u), an exporter chooses
8<: Accept; if   0 and   (; )Reject; otherwise : (11)
Proposition 2: (; ) is decreasing in .
Proofs: See appendix A.
Lemma 1 clearly shows that if an exporter satises the conditions for accepting, then in order to
build a good reputation in the shortest amount of time or to hide its bad productivity as long as
possible, an exporter ships all the goods produced in a given period of time.
Proposition 1 is one of the main results of this paper. It captures the strategic choices made
by exporters concerned with how current decisions aect their reputations and, thus, future prots.
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Consider the case when exporters make positive prots at a given time. Exporters still have to decide
whether to enter the market or not, because they not only care about their current prots but their
reputations, which aect future prots. For instance, if the current realization of the productivity shock
is suciently low such that accepting and shipping the goods, y, would aect the importers' beliefs in
a negative way, then an exporter i may not choose to send the good, despite earning current positive
prots. An exporter must weigh the current prot gain versus the discounted expected loss from future
prots resulting from a negative reputation. Clearly, if the latter is greater, then an exporter chooses
to reject even in the case of positive prots. Hence,  is the productivity threshold level which equates
the value of the discounted expected lifetime prot streams in the cases of accepting and rejecting.
An exporter may choose to reject an oer for multiple reasons: 1) the oer is too low relative to the
xed cost (rejection due to negative prots), 2) the exporter received a bad cost shock (rejection due to
negative prots), and/or 3) the exporter received a bad productivity shock (rejection due to protecting
reputation). Notice, however, importers have no way of exactly determining why an exporter rejects
the oer. Given this fact, we assume the potentially negative eect of a rejection signal is normalized
to 0, as seen in equation (6). Hence, regardless of the reason, rejection implies importers' beliefs remain
the same as in the previous period.
Proposition 2 shows that an increase in the mean of the beliefs, , in a given period of time decreases
the threshold productivity. This result is crucial for the decision of an exporter deciding whether to
accept or reject. Intuitively, if an exporter has a better reputation, then it can withstand worse shocks.
In other words, an exporter who already established a good name in the market can choose to accept
and send the goods even with a lower productivity shock.
3 The Case of U.S. Car Imports from Japan
In the above analysis, we introduced a mechanism stressing the importance of asymmetric information,
learning, and reputation in international trade. We now use our model to study a bilateral trade ow,
namely U.S. imports of Japanese passenger cars over the period 1961-2005. We choose to study this
particular trade ow for two reasons. First, the automobile sector is a large and important sector in
international trade. In the case of U.S. imports, passenger cars accounted for as much as 12.5% of
total imports over the period 1961-2005. Second, asymmetric information, reputation, and learning
occupy a leading role in explaining the evolution of Japanese car exports to the U.S. market. This claim
is supported by a number of authors, both in the economics literature (see Mannering and Winston
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(1991), Train and Winston (2007), and Wojcik (2001)) and in the popular press (see Crandall and
Winston (2005) and Gertner (2007)).
3.1 Japanese Simulations
Figure 2 shows U.S. passenger car imports from Japan over the period 1961-2005 from the OECD's
International Trade by Commodity Database. Very few Japanese cars were exported to the U.S. before
the 1970's. At the time, American consumers showed little interest in the lightweight compact cars
coming from Japan, preferring instead the larger models produced by GM, Ford, and Chrysler, the
so-called Big Three of automobile production. During the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, though, American
consumers began to show an interest in the fuel ecient Japanese cars. As consumers learned more
about the new Japanese cars, they discovered not only were the cars fuel ecient, but they were
also well-built and reliable vis-a-vis their American rivals. Wojcik (2001) studies American consumer
learning about a particular model, manufacturer, or Japanese cars in general during the 1970's, the
period of the oil crises, and the 1980's. Wojcik (2001) uses a data set in which approximately 9% of
households buy new cars each year. The share of new cars accounted for by Japanese imports increases
from 5:7% in 1971 to 26:1% in 1990, averaging 15:4% over the entire period. Wojcik (2001) nds all
three sources of learning impacted the demand for individual Japanese cars in the American market
and were signicant factors in the increase in overall Japanese market share.
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Figure 2:
U.S. Imports of Japanese Passenger Cars
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The oil crises of the 1970's gave the Japanese exporters the opportunity to signal to American
consumers about their cars and begin the process of building a reputation. In the years since the oil
crises, the reputation of Japanese cars consistently ranked among the highest in the automobile industry,
as publications like Consumer Reports clearly attest. Mannering and Winston (1991) documents that
consumer brand loyalty, one potential measure of reputation, towards Japanese produced cars relative
to American produced cars grew during the years after the oil crises. Mannering and Winston (1991)
shows this brand loyalty explains a signicant fraction of the increase in Japanese market share in the
1980's American automobile market. Through this signaling and learning process, U.S. car imports from
Japan increased dramatically after 1975, as shown in gure 2. In addition, Wojcik (2001) documents
total sales of Japanese cars in the U.S. as increasing by 427% over the years 1971-1990, while total new
car sales increased by only 9%. Total sales numbers for Japanese cars from 1971 to 1990 are primarily
being driven by imports, since Japanese manufactures did not begin setting up factories in the U.S.
until the mid-1980's.
In the language of our model, Japanese exporter i's actual productivity level, i, is high. However,
Japanese exporters face American importers with such low prior beliefs, ^i0, and thus such low oers, in
the years before the oil crises that Japanese exporters choose not to export. Eventually, the Japanese
exporters in the model face cost shocks good enough such that they are able to export. We interpret
the good cost shocks as the oil crises and a means by which Japanese exporters are able to signal
to American importers about themselves, despite initially being faced with unfavorable beliefs on the
part of American importers. Once American importers receive and consume a shipment of exporter
i's goods, they update their beliefs, which aects future decisions made by the Japanese exporters. In
this way, Japanese exporters eventually enter the American market and continue to export thereafter.
In order to run simulations to compare the model with the data, we rst choose parameters for the
case of Japan. Data used in determining the parameters of the model are collected from the OECD's
International Trade by Commodity Database, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, and
corporate websites of individual Japanese manufacturers.
There are two crucial relations for these simulations. The rst relation is between the actual
productivity level, , and the mean of the initial prior beliefs, ^0 :
 = ^0 + 1; (12)
where 1 2 R. 1 > 0 (< 0) corresponds to the case where the importers undervalue (overvalue)
exporters. 1 = 0 corresponds the case with no informational asymmetries.
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The second crucial relation is between the mean of the initial prior belief, ^0 , and the mean of the
initial ex-ante cost distribution, c:
^0 = c + 2; (13)
where 2 2 R. We refer to the cost distribution before the realization of uit as the ex-ante cost
distribution. Note that given the distribution of the cost shocks, the initial ex-ante cost distribution
will be normally distributed with mean f and variance 2u (=
2
c ). For simplicity, we set the variances
of the productivity shocks, 2 ; cost shocks, 
2
u; and initial prior beliefs, 
2
^0
, equal to one another and
denote them by 2 for both simulations. The more negative (positive) 2 is, the lower (higher) is the
probability of getting an initial oer greater than cost and, thus, having the chance to enter the market.
For the simulations, we set i = .
For the Japanese case, in order to identify 1 and 2, we rst use the average of the last 15 data
of U.S. imports of Japanese cars to identify :  = Avg. ydata of 91 05I , where I = 9 is the number of
Japanese exporters seen in the data. Given that importers initially undervalue the Japanese cars such
that there are almost no imports before the oil crises, we have 1 > 0 and 2 < 0. We set 1 = 10
in order to capture the dramatic dierence between the prior beliefs and the actual productivity of
Japanese exporters. We set 2 =  3 to capture the fact that there were almost no imports before the
oil crises.  and u are randomly chosen variables in the simulation. However, for the years during the oil
crises, the costs shocks are chosen to reect the positive eect of the oil crises for Japanese exporters.
We treat the cost shocks as random variables in the simulation before and after the oil crises.
Since 2 = 
2
^0
= 2u = 
2, which implies the variance of the initial ex-ante cost distribution, 2c ,
is also equal to 2, the choice of  is just a normalization. We set  equal to 200. Then, we calculate
the exact values of 1 and 2. Given the values of 1, 2, and , equations (12) and (13) pin down the
values of ^0 and c, i.e. f . We set  = 0:99. Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in the Japanese
simulations.
Parameter  ^0    u f T I
Value 3122 1122 200 0.99 0 0 1722 45 9
Table 1:
Model Simulation: Parameters
Figure 3 compares a sample trade ow simulation of our model,
IX
i=1
yit 8 t; (14)
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Figure 3:
Model Simulation: U.S. Imports of Japanese Passenger Cars
with the actual trade ow data on U.S. imports of Japanese cars over the years 1961-2005. The model
replicates both the period of low imports before the 1970's oil crises and, once the oil crises occur, the
subsequent years of increasing imports. All in all, gure 3 shows our model is capable of matching the
data well.
However, gure 3 presents one sample trade ow simulation of our model. In order to test the
reliability of this result, we construct a test of robustness. Figures 4 and 5 report our robustness
results. These gures are constructed by repeating the simulation 10000 times. We then report the
average of each year's 10000 simulation results. We also calculate the standard deviations for each
year's 10000 simulation results and, then, add and subtract two standard deviations from each year's
average to construct a condence interval. These bands measure the robustness of our results.
As an additional test of robustness, we chose the parameters of the Japanese simulation using an
alternative method which does not rely on choosing the cost shocks for a positive eect during the
years of the oil crises. In order to nd , c, and ^0 , we rst identify 1 and 2 by using a maximum
likelihood method. We found 's such that rms were most likely to enter the market during the years
of the oil crises. The likelihood function is as follows:
L =
I0Y
i=1
(i1 )(1  1)(1  i2):::(1  iT i); (15)
where I 0 = number of actual exporters;  = probability of the cost being greater than the oer, i.e.
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not entering the market during a given period; i = number of periods before exporter i enters the
market; and T = total time periods.13 Note that  is the parameter in the likelihood function related
to the parameters 1 and 2.
Intuitively, the rst term in the likelihood function, i1 , captures the rst i periods in which
exporter i is out of the market. Notice that this probability is not changing across exporters and
periods until the rst entrance into the market, because no updating has occurred yet. Since each
exporter potentially enters the market in dierent periods, i indexes  . The second term, (1   1),
corresponds with the ( + 1)th period when an exporter enters the market for the rst time. The
other terms correspond to the case when once exporters enter the market, they always stay in, which
captures the observed behavior of Japanese automobile rms. All the 0s, except 1, are potentially
dierent for each period and each exporter due to the updating mechanism (5). 2 closely relates to
1. All else equal, a high 2 will increase the chance of entering the market, which corresponds to a
low 1. 1 relates to all 's other than 1. All else equal, a high 1 decreases the probability of not
entering the market after the rst entrance, which corresponds to the 's other than 1 being low.
Given data collected on the entry dates of Japanese exporters into the American market, the  for
each exporter, we maximize the likelihood of not entering the market for  periods, entry in the (+1)th
period, and always being in the market thereafter for each exporter. Given each exporter's data,
maximum likelihood returns the optimal 's. We rst identify the 0s, then nd the corresponding
values of the 's in terms of . Using the entry data, we nd 1  0:98, and clearly all other 's are
equal to zero. By using the solution to 1, the distance between ^0 and c must be  3  , so we set
2 =  3  . The other 's tell us the probability of not entering the market after the rst entrance is
zero. This implies that the posterior mean of the importers' beliefs should be suciently greater than
the mean of the cost. By choosing 1 = 10  , we virtually guarantee this will be the case.14
Since 2 = 
2
^0
= 2, and as a result the variance of the initial ex-ante cost distribution is also
equal to 2, the choice of  is just a normalization. Again, this simplication does not change our
results. After nding the optimal 's and corresponding 's in terms of , we set  equal to 200.
Then, we calculate the exact values of 1 and 2. We assume the 's are the same for the exporters
and derive these from aggregate trade data. We set  equal to the average of the last ve data:
 = Avg. ydata of 00 05I0 .
The above procedure gives us 1, 2, and . We use equation (12) to calculate ^0 . Using this
13I 0 is taken from the data. We later identify the potential number of exporters, I, which we explain below in detail.
14Our choice of 1 = 10   makes the probability of not entering the market after the rst entrance close, but not
exactly equal, to zero.
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result and 2, we calculate c, i.e. f , from equation (13). We choose  = 0:99. We want the model's
actual number of exporters, I 0, to be 9, as in the actual data. Therefore, we use a maximum likelihood
method to nd the optimal number of potential exporters, I, most likely to generate I 0 = 9:
L =
 
I
9
!
(0:4082)I 9(0:5918)9: (16)
The rst term denotes the choice of 9 exporters among the I potential exporters. 0:4082 is the prob-
ability of not entering the market for 45 periods.15 (I   9) is the number of rms not entering the
market for the entire 45 periods. 0:5918 is the probability of entering the market at some point during
the 45 periods. Using this method, I = 15. Table 2 summarizes the parameters obtained using the
maximum likelihood method.
Parameter  ^0    u f T I
Value 3538 1538 200 0.99 0 0 2138 45 15
Table 2:
Model Simulation: Parameters, Maximum Likelihood Method
These alternative simulations generate similar results as those in gures 3, 4, and 5, and we do not
present them here.
The model's ability to match the data in gures 3, 4, and 5 depends crucially on two factors, the
timing of the cost shocks and the learning, or reputation, process. In order to show the importance
of these two factors, we conduct a number of experiments.16 The cost shocks in the model reect the
benet of the oil crises for Japanese exporters. Keeping everything else in the simulations unchanged,
it is clear that if the timing of these cost shocks changes, then the model is unable to match the
data. However, the historical record suggests the oil crises were large and important shocks for the
automobile industry, which motivates the choice of the timing of the cost shocks in our simulations.
Any alternative theory attempting to explain the data on Japanese car exports must take seriously the
impact of the oil crises.
Given the timing of the cost shocks coincides with the oil crises, we test how learning aects the
model's ability to match the data. First, we analyze what happens when we turn o the learning
mechanism in the model. Second, keeping the learning mechanism turned o, what happens if we
add positive productivity shocks? Both of these experiments highlight the importance of learning and
reputation as an explanation for the data versus alternative theories relying only on temporary shocks,
15This probability is derived using the distance between ^0 and c, 2 =  3  
16We only provide discussion of these experiments here. The results are available upon request.
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such as productivity or exchange rate shocks.
Keeping everything else in the simulations unchanged, we turn o the learning mechanism by setting
h close to 0 (see equation (5)).
17 The model simulations cannot match the data when the learning
mechanism is turned o. Once Japanese exporters receive the good cost shocks during the oil crises,
they export to American importers. Americans do not update their beliefs about Japanese exporters,
however, and continue to make low oers to Japanese exporters. Once the cost shock benets end
after the oil crises, Japanese exporters receive unprotable oers and exit the American market. The
model's simulated time series would consist of a positive spike in exports during the oil crises years and
then an equivalent drop in exports once the crises end. As a result, temporary shocks without learning
cannot generate a model time series consistent with the observed data.
As long as the learning mechanism is turned o, it does not matter if these shocks take the form of
productivity shocks. We consider the case by adding positive productivity shocks to the simulations
while keeping the learning mechanism turned o. The only dierence than the previous case is that the
temporary increase in exports during the oil crises is now greater due to the additional boost from the
positive productivity shocks. But, again, American importers do not learn about Japanese exporters
and, thus, continue to make low oers to the Japanese. Japanese exporters eventually exit the market
once the benets from the oil crises subside. These exercises show the importance of the timing of the
cost shocks and the learning process in generating simulated model data consistent with the observed
real data.
4 Additional General Results
In order to analyze the impact of asymmetric information, learning, and reputation on international
trade patterns, we show the importance of dierentiating between the short run and long run. This
dierentiation is crucial in terms of understanding trade patterns seen in the data and the implications
of trade policies, such as import taris and export subsidies, in a world characterized by asymmetric
information. We organize all the results in this section around numerical simulations of the model, the
details of which are described in appendix B.
17We do not set h exactly equal to 0 since the variance would be innite.
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4.1 Short Run vs. Long Run
As in closed economies, asymmetric information can cause adverse selection problems in international
markets in the short run. As time passes, a reduced information problem can be a solution to adverse
selection. In the context of our model, any additional information achieved by the signals from exporters
will aid importers in their learning process and help importers to update their information sets.
In the long run, importers' beliefs converge to the actual values of each exporter's productivity, i.
This implies i will be fully known in the limit. As a result, in the long run, relatively more productive
exporters end up with larger amounts of exports. Relatively less productive exporters will still export
but in relatively smaller amounts. A subset of these relatively less productive exporters will end up
not exporting at all. These long run results are not dierent from existing trade literature and match
those of Melitz (2003). However, in the short run these trade patterns can be potentially dierent.
In order to better understand this result, consider an example in which there are two types of
exporters: exporters of type H have high productivity, and those of type L have low productivity.
There are potentially many exporters of each type. Exporter H is relatively more productive than
exporter L, but this may not be true in terms of beliefs. Suppose at time t = 0 the imperfect
information is such that importers believe exporters of type L are relatively more productive than H .
Given these conditions, the model predicts the trade ows depicted in gure 6. Exporters of type
L start with exporting a relatively higher amount due to the importers' beliefs, which result in higher
oers. But, as time passes, the amount of type L's exports decreases. This occurs through importers
learning about the actual productivity of exporters of type L, which in turn decreases the oers for
these exporters. At the same time that the exports by type L are decreasing, the exports by type H
are increasing due to a similar learning and reputation building mechanism. Once importers are able to
learn about exporters of type H , the oers made to these exporters increase. As a result of these two
eects, the trade patterns switch over time. Figure 6 shows the exporters of both types converging to
a long run pattern, but the transition to these long run patterns, that is, the short run trade patterns,
can be dramatically dierent due to asymmetric information, leading to an adverse selection problem.
In the short run, importers are largely importing from exporters of type L, instead of H . Over
time, though, this adverse selection problem is solved. Signals by H exporters reveal more and more
information, and type H exporters build a stronger reputation. Eventually, goods from exporters of
type H dominate the trade ows.
We can use this result to further our discussion of U.S. imports of Japanese Cars. Since this paper
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Model Simulation: Total Exports, High vs. Low Productivity
develops a model of international trade, it is natural to study a signicant bilateral trade relationship.
The other side of the story about U.S. imports of Japanese cars is, of course, the oft-lamented decline in
the competitiveness of the American automobile industry. The same Consumer Reports documenting
the positive reputation of most Japanese cars documents the negative reputation of many American
cars. The gap between American consumers' beliefs about Japanese and American cars is not im-
proving. Indeed, Crandall and Winston (2005) compares annual issues of Consumer Reports in 1985
and 2005 suggesting this fact. In 1985, American consumers who purchased American cars were six
times more likely to need \worse than average" or \much worse than average" car repairs than those
consumers owning Japanese cars. American cars were still ve times more likely than Japanese cars to
need major repairs in 2005.
Reputation and consumer beliefs have their consequences. Figure 7 presents data taken from Train
and Winston (2007) on American and Japanese market share of car sales in the U.S..18 In the context of
the model, if we consider American and Japanese manufactures as exporters trying to sell to importers,
or American consumers, then the above result helps to understand gure 7. Notice the relation between
gures 6 and 7. Recall gure 6 shows total exports of low and high productivity exporters. Importers'
beliefs are such that low productivity rms dominate the market initially and only later do high
productivity rms enter the market and eventually dominate. With American manufactures being the
18We only include American and Japanese manufacturers. As a result, the shares do not sum to 100.
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American and Japanese Market Share of Car Sales in the U.S.
low productivity rms and Japanese manufactures being the high productivity rms, gure 6 provides
a possible explanation for gure 7. Although gure 7 shows Japanese market share in 2005 as still
being 2% lower than American, it seems almost certain that the \switching" in relative positions seen
in gure 6 will occur, especially in light of such news as Toyota overtaking General Motors as the largest
car manufacturer for the rst time in 2007.19 A similar switching has already occurred in the market
shares of total vehicle sales in the U.S., as the share of vehicle sales due to non-American vehicles
passed the share due to American for the rst time in history in 2008. Whatever the future holds for
American car manufacturers, our model suggests inuencing consumers' beliefs by rebuilding a good
reputation will be necessary if the trends seen in gure 7 are to be reversed.
4.2 Speed of Learning and Reputation Building
The learning and reputation process in our model depends on how the importers' beliefs evolve over
time. As a result, the manner in which the beliefs change will inuence the trade patterns predicted
by the model. How the importers' beliefs evolve depends on the nature of the good being exported.
Dierent sectors are associated with dierent learning and reputation processes. For example, Shapiro
(1983) points out that beliefs about cars change only slowly. Consumers do not completely change their
beliefs about a car manufacture after one period. The consumers partially adjust their beliefs, giving
19See Bradsher (2007) for reporting on this event.
22
05
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Ho(j)
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f P
er
io
ds
Figure 8:
Model Simulation: Transition from 5% to 50% of Max. Exports
weight not only to what they see as their new car but also to their previously held beliefs. This occurs
because certain attributes of a car, like its durability, are dicult, if not impossible, to immediately
detect. Over time, these beliefs change as the car is used. An example of a sector associated with rapid
learning and reputation processes is the agricultural goods sector. Consumers can easily inspect and
discern the nature of the good by tasting the food or beverage, updating their beliefs immediately.
In our model, we capture the learning and reputation process associated with a sector j by the
initial ratio of the precision of the importers' beliefs to the precision of the idiosyncratic productivity
shock, H0(j) =
h^i0 (j)
h(j)
, where H0(j) 2 (0;1). As a result, when using equation (5) to update their
beliefs for the next period, importers attach weights h^i0(j) and h(j) to their prior beliefs and the
exporter's signal, respectively. H0(j) = 1 corresponds to the case when importers attach equal weights
to their prior beliefs and the exporter's signal, while H0(j) > 1 (H0(j) < 1) corresponds to when
importers attach relatively more (less) weight to their prior beliefs.
Sectors in which importers place relatively more weight, h^i0(j), on their prior beliefs are those with
a relatively high H0(j). Learning and reputation building occur relatively slowly over time in these
sectors, as in the car example above. Sectors in which importers place relatively less weight, h^i0(j),
on their prior beliefs are those with a relatively low H0(j). Learning and reputation building occur
relatively faster in these sectors, as in the agricultural goods example above.
Figure 8 shows how the model's predicted trade patterns change with changes in H0. The higher
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H0 is, the slower is the increase in total exports. Figure 8 reports one measure capturing the dierence
in the speed at which total exports increase, namely the number of periods required to transition from
5% to 50% of the maximum level of total exports.
4.3 Information and Trade Policies
We now extend the basic model from section 2 to incorporate trade barriers and export subsidies. In
addition to the traditional increase or decrease in the volume of trade, our model highlights another
dimension of trade barriers and export subsidies, namely their eect on the extent of asymmetric
information existing between importers and exporters.
In order to measure the extent of these information problems in our model, we need to identify the
relation between importers' beliefs and exporters' true characteristics. After the realization of output
at the end of time t, yitit = it, which potentially may be dierent than 1. it can be interpreted as a
measure of informational problems among importers and exporter i at time t. The further it is from 1,
the more information problems there are between importers and exporter i. it > 1 corresponds to the
case when importers undervalue exporter i. it < 1 corresponds to the case when importers overvalue
exporter i. it is an important dimension in international trade which we study under three dierent
trade policy regimes: trade barriers, export subsidies, and free trade with no export subsidies.
Among other things, trade barriers can be thought of as import taris or transportation costs, the
former incurred by importers and the latter incurred by exporters. In the context of our model, we
view these trade barriers as a friction which reduces the oer received by an exporter. In the case
of an import tari, importers pay some share of their oer it as a tari. The importers' new oers
including the tari payment can be denoted as ~it and will necessarily be lower than it.
20 In the case
of transportation costs, exporters pay some amount from it to ship their goods to the home country,
hence the portion left over as prot can be denoted ~it. Instead of drawing a distinction between these
two types of trade barriers, we simply model trade barriers as some xed payment,  , taken from it.
Government export subsidies can also be used to aect trade patterns and the extent of asymmetric
information between importers and exporters. We do not explicitly model a government's problem in
this section but consider export subsidies exogenously available to the foreign country exporters. In
terms of the exporter's problem, an export subsidy can be modeled as a xed amount,  , subtracted
from the exporter's cost of exporting, cit. We can then denote the cost of exporting under an export
subsidy as ~cit, which is necessarily lower than cit.
20Recall that importers' optimal oers without taris at time t for each exporter i is given by equation (4).
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Model Simulation: Kappa, Dierent Trade Policies
Figure 9 compares the informational environment under the three dierent policy regimes by re-
porting the 's associated with each regime. Figure 9 reports an average aggregate measure of .
Trade barriers increase information problems, since it is more dicult for exporters to enter the mar-
ket to begin with. Export subsidies, however, decrease the informational problems between importers
and exporters. To the best of our knowledge, this is not an aspect of export subsidies which is often
considered when discussing policy implications.
5 Conclusion
We have attempted to enrich the study of international trade theory by developing a framework which
casts asymmetric information, learning, and reputation as the leading roles. In our framework, inter-
national trade takes place when exporters accept belief-based oers from importers in exchange for
shipments of exporters' goods. Importers then update their beliefs according to signals derived from
the arrival of the exporters' goods. These new beliefs determine the new oers made to exporters and,
consequently, aect the subsequent decision of whether to export. As a result, learning and reputation
building change the informational environment in which importers and exporters interact and, thus,
have a direct eect on the determination of international trade patterns.
The most obvious, yet important, implication of our framework for the study of international trade
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is that a rm's ability to export depends not only on its characteristics but also on what importers
believe about those characteristics. The history of Japanese car exports to the U.S. reects this main
idea. Existing literature and available evidence create a compelling case for asymmetric information,
learning, and reputation to be at the heart of any explanation of Japanese car imports. We show our
model is capable of replicating the experience of U.S. car imports from Japan over the period 1961-2005.
In addition to deepening our understanding of these events, we discuss further implications of our
framework. Since learning and reputation building require time, our model forces us to also take
seriously the dierence in short run and long run trade patterns. The long run results of our model
match those of Melitz (2003), but the short run results can be quite dierent. We show how sectorial
dierences in the speed of learning and reputation building aect predicted trade patterns. The extent
of asymmetric information existing between importers and exporters also changes under dierent trade
policies, and we compare the free trade, trade barrier, and export subsidy cases of our model.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Proofs of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
The oer (4) and learning (5) equations together imply that oers at time t+1 are strictly increasing
in the amount of y exported at time t. Clearly, prot is strictly increasing in the oer (and recall that
f is independent of y). Finally, the exporter's objective function is strictly increasing in prots. Taken
together, these imply yit = i + it under the decision to accept.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The sequential version of the exporter's problem can be written as follows: For t =  , given Lemma
1, the oer (4), and the learning process (5) and (6), an exporter i solves maxfAi ; Rig subject
to the constraints Ai = i (y
 1
i ) + E [i+1(y

i )] + ::: ; Ri = 0 + E [^i+1(y^

i )] + ::: ; and also
subject to nonnegative prots for every period. Prots in the case when an exporter accepts are
it(y
t 1
i ) = it(y
t 1
i )  cit. In the case when an exporter rejects, prots are it(yt 1i ) = 0.21 Similarly,
the cost of exporting when an exporter accepts is given by cit = f   uit. When an exporter rejects,
cit = 0. At t =  , an exporter i chooses whether to accept or reject given the oer (beliefs of importers)
and realized shocks (; u). A and R are the expected discounted lifetime prot streams in the cases of
accepting and rejecting.  and ^ refer to the prots in the cases of accepting and rejecting. Since the
exporter solves the problem at t =  conditional on the information at  , expectations are conditional
on  .
Given the problem above, we dene uit=0 as the threshold for zero prots at time t. If uit  uit=0 ,
then it  0, and if uit < uit=0 , then it < 0. Given the oer and f , uit=0 can be obtained from
it(y
t 1
i ) = it(y
t 1
i )   f + uit. it is the threshold productivity shock dened by the following: if
it  it; then A  R; and if it < it; then A < R.
There are potentially four dierent cases. We rst summarize the results of the dierent cases and
then prove the results in the remainder of the appendix. For both of the cases when uit < uit=0 ,
the nonnegative prot constraint binds, and exporter i rejects the oer.22 For the case uit=0 < uit
and it  it, exporter i realizes nonnegative prots during the current period and anticipates a higher
expected discounted lifetime prot stream from accepting compared to rejecting. As a result, exporter
i accepts the oer in this case. In the last case, uit=0 < uit and it > it, exporter i has nonnegative
21We suppress yt 1i from now on.
22Specically, the rst case is uit < uit=0 and it < it, and the second case is uit < uit=0 and it  it.
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prots during the current period, but the expected discounted lifetime prot stream from accepting
will be lower than that from rejecting. Intuitively, an exporter i can make nonnegative prots by
accepting the oer but will aect its reputation in such a way that the current gain from prots will
not compensate the future loss caused by a bad reputation. Exporter i rejects the oer in this case.
In order for the decision of accepting to be optimal, two conditions have to be satised at time  .
First, clearly, the nonnegativity condition for prots, i  0, must hold. Second, the R.H.S. of the
following equation also has to be greater than or equal to the L.H.S. (i.e. R  A):
0 +   E [^i+1] + 2  E [^i+2] + :::| {z }
R
S i +   E [i+1] + 2  Et[i+2] + :::| {z }
A
(A.1)
Given the xed parameters, realized ui , and an oer at time  , i determines whether the R.H.S.
or L.H.S. of (A.1) is greater. The R.H.S. of equation (A.1) is strictly increasing in i , and the L.H.S.
is independent of i . Hence, there exists a unique i which equates L.H.S and R.H.S..
Figure 10 shows the curves for the cumulative expected discounted prot across time under dierent
i 's. The nal end points of the curves correspond to the nite values of the expected discounted
lifetime prot streams. In gure 10, 1i > 
2
i > i > 
3
i :
Now, let's look at why the R.H.S. is strictly increasing in i : A higher i corresponds to a higher
yi , which means, by equation (5), higher i 's correspond to a higher oer at time  +1. As a result, a
higher i corresponds to a higher expected discounted prot at time  +1. Moreover, a higher oer in
expected terms at time  +1 corresponds to a higher oer at time  +2 in expected terms. As a result,
a higher i also corresponds to a higher expected discounted prot at time  +2. The same reasoning
holds for future periods. Hence, this result shows that a higher i corresponds to a higher cumulative
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expected discounted prot curve in gure 10. Notice that all curves begin at the same value on the
y-axis in the case of accepting, since i does not aect the prot at time  . The curve corresponding
to 1i is higher than that corresponding to 
2
i . As i becomes lower, the corresponding curve lowers
in gure 10 as well. At some point, the curve corresponding to i , which we denote i , converges to
the reject curve. Recall that the reject curve is independent of i : i makes equation (A.1) hold with
equality.
3i , which is lower than the threshold, i , makes the R.H.S. less than the L.H.S. in equation (A.1).
The curve corresponding to 3i shows the acceptance (notice that acceptance is not optimal) case in
which i < i . Under this condition, current prots at time  , seen in gure 10 as the intersection
with the y-axis, are greater than zero for 3i and equal to zero for the reject curve. At some point,
the reject curve crosses the 3i curve and remains above thereafter. At time  + n, at which point
the reject curve crosses the 3i curve, the expected oer for the reject case has to be greater than the
expected oer for the acceptance case. This guarantees the reject curve remains above the 3i curve
by the same reasoning in the previous case above. Since the reject curve converges to a higher value
than the 3i curve (i.e. higher expected discounted lifetime prot), rejecting is the optimal decision
for exporter i in the case in which uit0 < uit and it > it. Similarly, for the case when i  0 and
i  i , accepting and exporting is optimal, because the discounted expected lifetime prot is greater
than that when rejecting.
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove proposition 2, we already know that given the oer and the xed parameters, including
the realized ui , there exists a threshold i which equates equation (A.1). Fixing other parameters
constant, increasing the mean of the beliefs, i , at time  , increases the R.H.S. more than the L.H.S.
at time  . Since the L.H.S. is independent of i and the R.H.S. is strictly increasing in i , the new
threshold equating equation (A.1) is smaller.
Appendix B: Numerical Simulations
This section explains the details of the simulations in section 4 and presents the parameters used in
each simulation. In all the simulations, there is a set of benchmark parameters with which to compare
dierent situations. The benchmark case will be compared with overvalued beliefs (gure 6 from section
4.1), under dierentH0's (gure 8 from section 4.2), and with trade barriers and export subsidies (gure
9 from section 4.3).
For the benchmark case, the number of time periods is set to T = 100 in order to show the potential
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dierences in the short and long run. We set the potential number of exporters to I = 15, where the
number of actual exporters is determined endogenously. We choose the discount factor  = 0:99. The
parameters of the prior belief distribution are ^0 = 1000 and ^0 = 100. We set the actual productivity
to  = 2000. For simplication, all the exporters have the same actual productivity level, , which
can be interpreted as a normalization. Note that the benchmark case corresponds to the case where
importers undervalue exporters. Posterior beliefs are determined endogenously. We set the parameters
for productivity shocks and cost shocks to be the same:  = c = 0 and  = u = 100. As a result
of this parametrization, H = 1 in the benchmark case, i.e. importers give equal weight to their beliefs
and their experience in each period. Finally, the parameter of the cost function is set to f = 1300.
In the rst simulation (gure 6), we compare two cases, one in which importers undervalue exporters
(benchmark) and another in which importers overvalue exporters. We choose two opposite examples
of importers' beliefs in order to highlight the eect of asymmetric information and the importance
of learning, reputation building, and signaling. The parameters of the benchmark case are described
above. For the case when importers overvalue exporters, we just change the parameters ^0 and  and
keep all the other parameters the same. We set ^0 = 2000 and  = 1200: We run the simulations
10000 times and present the average values of these simulations in gure 6.
In the second simulation (gure 8), we compare dierent H0's, xing all the other parameters to
be the same as the parameters in the benchmark case above. We let H0 2 [1; 45] to show the results
under dierent values for H0. We change the precision of the prior beliefs, h^i0 , in order to get dierent
values of H0 in the simulations. Again, we run the simulations 10000 times and present the average
values.
In the third simulation (gure 9), we compare the benchmark case with two other cases. The
rst case is the one with trade barriers, and the second case is the one with export subsidies. The
benchmark case can be interpreted as free trade with no export subsidy policies. In the trade barriers
case,  = +50 and all the remaining parameters are the same. Recall,  = 0 corresponds to the
benchmark case. In the export subsidies case,  =  50 and, again, all the other parameters are the
same as those in the benchmark case. Figure 9 shows how the extent of asymmetric information, ,
changes under dierent policy regimes. We take the average over I exporters in a given simulation,
and, then, we run the simulations 10000 times and present the average values over the simulations.
Since we run the simulations 10000 times, the eects of productivity shocks are washed out of .
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